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Hans Rainer Sepp es uno de los filósofos 
más originales de los últimos tiempos, su 
apropiación de la fenomenología trascen-
dental le ha conducido a trazar un proyec-
to propio: la ‘oikología’, cuyos rasgos, 
preguntas y relaciones [con otros cam-
pos de las ciencias de la vida] tratamos 
de explorar en este diálogo con el autor 
de In Grundrisse der Oikologie [2019]. La 
oikología es una de las derivaciónes más 
amplias de la fenomenología trascenden-
tal, pues toca desde su inicio los temas 
centrales del análisis fenomenológico, la 
corporalidad, la imaginación, la praxis. 
Si el modo de estar y ser humano en el 
mundo consiste en “hacerse” un lugar en 
el mundo, la oikología se presta primera-
mente como una fenomenología del lu-
gar y el territorio. Se trata, en todo caso, 
de una filosofía del lugar [o la situación 
corporal], del proyecto y de la vida como 
esta continua actividad de hacerse o bus-
carse una morada. La filosofía oikológica 
de Hans Rainer Sepp retorna al punto de 
partida de la filosofía [con la ganancia 
trascendental de la historia] al re-formular 
la pregunta por el sentido del mundo que 
se gesta en el lugar y se manifiesta en el 
territorio animal, en el sitio que se hace la 
vida como mundo, como casa.  
Palabras clave: Fenomenología trascen-
dental    Corporalidad   Territorialidad 
Hans Rainer Sepp is one of the most original 
philosophers of our time, his appropriation 
of transcendental phenomenology has led 
him to build his own project on oikology, 
which features problems and content that 
we have tried to explore in this dialogue 
from his book In. Grundrisse der Oikologie 
[2019]. The oikology is one of the broader 
drifts of transcendental phenomenology 
because it focus on the central subjects 
in phenomenology; the body, the imagi-
nation and praxis. If the way in which the 
human being is in the world, is creating its 
place in the world, then oikology is primar-
ily a philosophy of place and territory. It is, 
in any case, a philosophy about place [or 
embodied situation], the project and life 
as this continuous activity to build and find 
a home. Oikological philosophy by Hans 
Rainer Sepp turns to the starting point of 
philosophy [with the transcendental his-
torical profit] by returning to the question 
about the sense of the world that gestates 
in the dwelling and is expressed in the ani-
mal territory, and in the place that in life we 
constitute as world or home. 
Key words: Transcendental phenome-
nology    Embodied experience   Terri-
toriality
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intRODuctiOn
The academic definition of transcendental phenomenology is as a sci-ence focused on the analysis of the world sense genesis. The phe-nomenological philosophy pretends, as a philosophical goal, to rig-
orously analyze life itself, if life is here understood as a life of consciousness, 
continuous constituent activity [to serve us of another definitional formula]. 
We can realize this description in the first person perspective, attending to 
the development of a method, which its main purpose is to open a space 
of exploration, and to disclose it to a philosophical gaze. The problem is 
the world, the lived world. In the first place, the problem is the life if it’s 
understood, as the life that has a world; the issue of transcendentalism is 
the correlation itself, that this link which in a sense is at play, is the most 
important in the philosophy of life as the one that phenomenology pursues 
and from which Hans Rainer Sepp takes a productive advantage.
Hans Rainer Sepp is part of transcendental tradition, from which he 
generates a new way, an original path to think that transcendentality which 
leads phenomenology to a primal interest focus, the world experience; this 
vitality is manifested in the action to make itself a place in the world, the 
experience which means a dwelling thought from its radicality, its root in 
the ‘measure’ and its genesis in the corporeality. The body and territoriality 
originated in the appropriation of body are some of the issues of oikol-
ogy. The oikological philosophy can be seen as Rainer Sepp expresses it 
in this dialogue, as a Philosophy of Culture, but at the same time that this 
overtakes the oppositional limits between nature and culture, therefore it 
prefigures rather as a philosophy of life. 
The first part of this conversation, that is here published, occurred on June 
18th 2018 in Professor Rainer’s office, in the Humanities Faculty of Karlova 
Univerzita [Prague, Czech Republic]. This dialogue of almost three hours 
focused on a few items from a questionnaire that I had prepared. When the 
dinner time came, and we had to take a break from the conversation about 
oikology to take the subway toward Andel station near Prague’s downtown. 
During dinner our discussion took another route, on the history of philoso-
phy and the place of phenomenology in relationship with certain compre-
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hension of this history as a continuous movement of a reform, a continu-
ous return to an original or primal question, about the world. We touch the 
theme of epoché as a philosophical exercise, and, finally, we were able to 
talk about his own relationship with Heidegger’s and Fink’s philosophy. At 
the end of this very productive meeting, professor Rainer judged that the 
nature of the questionnaire deserved maybe a paused reflexion and better 
ordered answers than this informal conversation, which is why the answers 
were written directly by professor Rainer Sepp. I expressed my gratitude to 
professor Rainer for the time dedicated to this exercise, and the opportu-
nity to further advance the reader’s interest in this line of study which sum-
marizes the main features of the original phenomenological appropriation 
that Rainer Sepp has carried out. Around the oikology one of the most vital 
and vigorous path of transcendental phenomenology is at play, a way which 
touches the most intimate core of life itself, the embodied condition in the 
the sense world genesis.
Finally, I appreciate the generous support of Professor E. Behnke in re-
viewing and correcting this document.
Marcela Venebra. While it’s true that method no longer counts as an oi-
kological category, as you pointed out, in a certain way oikology is revealed 
through phenomenological reduction [that is, a method]. What is the rela-
tionship between oikology and the method of reduction?
Hans Rainer Sepp. To describe the starting point and method of oikolo-
gy, one can begin with a remark that Husserl formulated in a letter to Ernst 
Mach in 1903: the bodily and corporeal positionality of the subject, our con-
crete existential situation, forms the center of an “original circle” of experi-
ence. [I want to use the term “bodily-corporeal” not only to name abilities 
of the living human body [Leib], but also to include the physical corporeality 
of the body [Körper]1 with which I offer resistance to the real; corporeality 
is not understood in an objectifying sense, but as a fact of real subjective 
existence.] 
Husserl’s remark gives a double hint: the subject is centered in itself [as 
“zero-point,” as he says in several places], and at the same time it is in a 
situation, has an environment around it, lives in a social world. It is both ab-
solut: an absolutely separated [cfr. Levinas’s séparation] in-dividuality, and 
non-absolute: included, and being included means that it needs means for 
1  The difference is stablished in the phenomenological analysis about constitution 
between “Körper” as a physical or matherial thing and Leib-Körper as self-conscious cor-
poreality. Cf. E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie, Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Husser-
liana IV, Walter Biemel [Ed.], Martinus Nijhoff [La Haya: 1952]. Ed. cast., trad. Antonio Zirión 
Quijano. Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica. Libro 
Segundo: Investigaciones filosóficas sobre la constitución [México: FCE, 2005]. 
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its life and for experiencing with all its senses. With reference to a phenom-
enology of our bodily-corporeal status it can be said that subjectivity [a] in 
its separation functions as a “borderline body” [Grenzleib] and [b] in its re-
lation to the means of life through the use of the senses realizes itself as an 
“orienting body” [Richtungsleib], whereby [c] it constitutes strata of mean-
ing [Sinnleib]. The consequence of this, however, is that human existence is 
characterized not only by simply being in a world, as Heidegger says, but by 
the fact that there are two modes of being-in: first, the being-in of my bodi-
ly-corporeal subjectivity, existing in the original circle of my life [let us call 
it being-in 1], and second, the imaginative being-in, the being-in-the-world 
that is formed in the context of a social world [being-in 2].
The orienting, desiring body is related back to the boundary of the ze-
ro-point of a corporealized subjectivity and at the same time forms its world-
ly connections: this self-realization of the “movement of human existence” 
[Patočka] refers to the fundamental moment of method. To live life, to carry 
it out—this means to be orienting, to be “on the way,” to realize the metho-
dos. This does not imply that the method is an absolute, but on the contrary 
means recognizing that every kind of methodology is bound back to life in 
its progress, so that one can say that living life is synonymous with the fact 
of being methodical in an original sense. 
But then the birth of theoria is merely an extreme mode of this movement 
of life, and the phenomenological version of theoria is its radicalized stage 
[Husserl says theoria is also practice, a practice with which life turns against 
the “natural” practical attitude, which is a derivative form of practice]. Prac-
tice and theoretical practice are thus tied back to the self-realization of life: 
to the fact that subjectivity carries out its moving in the sense that it breaks 
it, re-flects it. Accordingly, human existence is [a] centered as an ab-solute 
subjectivity in each case; [b] orienting itself in response to the stimulations 
of its environment; and [c] eccentric because of its ability to break the ori-
enting [desiring] mode of its life anchored in its zero-point and return to 
itself, e.g., finally to establish a method in the usual theoretical sense.
Husserl refers to the horizontal interaction of subject and environment, 
but at the same time emphasizes that theoretical reflection can break out 
of this horizontal relationship by establishing a verticality in exposing the 
transcendental. This unveiling, the incision in the horizontal world-reference, 
is, in oikological terms, the separation of the forms of being-in 1 and 2 nor-
mally welded together in the context of our social life [being-in 2]. We have 
to think that this incision, as a theoretical act that is basically practice, realizes 
itself in a world-context, i.e., that the vertical is formed within the horizontal 
itself by transforming its structure through the release of the transcenden-
tal. This is the starting point of oikology and of an oikological method, i.e., 
oikology goes back to the origins of the “methodological” movement of 
human existence by analyzing two basic modes of motion.
1. On the one hand, oikology addresses the original socialization of in-
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dividual subjectivity and thus of the two ways of being-in and their mutual 
reference. This takes place within the framework of a vertical genealogical 
analysis that breaks down the formed world-approaches and reconstructs the 
transcendental development of subjectivity as it has developed in different 
cultures in times and spaces. Here it must be shown how the house [dwelling, 
settlement] is the decisive factor that makes the existential movement from 
being-in 1 to being-in 2 as original socialization plausible. Reconstructing 
retrogressively, genealogically, the factual “methodological” movements of 
existence means to understand from the beginning the results that these 
movements have led to, the results in which and through which we live. To 
refer to the past is therefore first of all an attempt to uncover the boundaries 
drawn by existential presuppositions. By becoming recognizable possibili-
ties of world-formation that have not yet been realized, a reference to the 
future is also implied in this direction to the past, because this procedure 
liberates the present from the compulsion to petrify itself in the standstill of 
already formed shapes.
2. Furthermore, oikology has to investigate the ways in which possibili-
ties have already been opened up, in intercultural contexts, of turning the 
horizontal style of existing in a world into a vertical one—for example, in 
transcendental phenomenology and in [Zen] Buddhism.
If the method of oikological philosophy is an intensified reflection of the 
“methodological” movement of existence, and if the movements of phi-
losophy are only a special realization of the reflexive force of life itself, oi-
kology can also be described as a “philosophy of philosophy,” a philoso-
phy that—among other processes of existential movements—reveals the 
respective existential prerequisites of philosophical manifestations. With 
regard to phenomenology, the question is not how epochē and reduction in 
a theoretical sense provide the methodological basis for a [transcendental] 
phenomenology, but what the practical realization of the epochē means for 
the transformation of life. 
In this respect, oikology realizes the idea of a philosophia perennis in a 
new way by mediating between the basic experiences implied in each phi-
losophy. The starting point, therefore, is not the ideal of a philosophy guid-
ed by the premise that philosophizing takes place through arguments, but 
the real fact of a multiplicity of philosophies, each based on previous experi-
ences, so that the task is to uncover their genesis and coherence. In this way, 
the unity of philosophy does not stand at the beginning, but would emerge 
in an open-ended process. And in a certain sense this is also a reformulation 
of a Husserlian idea.
MV. If the natural attitude is necessarily economic, and if it is in this atti-
tude that the measure is established, how do you describe the relationship 
between oikology and economy?
HRS. The starting point of an oikological theory of the economic is 
also the relation of being-in 1 and being-in 2. Here this relation is to be 
184
Marcela Venebra
Acta Mexicana de Fenomenología. Revista de Investigación filosófica y científica. No. 4 Junio de 2019
described as the result of a deception. The German words Tausch [bar-
ter] and Täuschung [deception] point to a mutual relationship: Tausch as 
Vertauschung [permutation]. The occlusion of being-in 1 by the process of 
social constitution resulting in being-in 2 can be described as an original 
exchange, as an Ur-Tausch. Here we can formulate two theses: 1. the occur-
rence of this original exchange is the condition for any economic exchange, 
whereby a social world is constituted in such a way that its members fight 
over an object; and 2. thinking about economic conditions means that this 
original exchange must be interrupted in order to take into account the 
skipped and forgotten bodily subjectivity [being-in 1]. In this respect, the 
common mistake both of capitalism and of communism / socialism—and 
also of all theories that proceed from an already socially endowed world—
is that the place of the in-dividual, the ab-solute subject, is skipped. In 
contrast, it is necessary to include this subject in order to understand the 
function of natural egocentrism in the formation of the social world on 
the basis of the fight over the object.
MV. How do you describe the relationship between oikology and ecolo-
gy? I am thinking about a possible transcendental ecology, an ecology that 
describes the constitution of nature as property, as well as an environment, 
and at the same time, as something different from the ego itself in the hu-
man being’s case. This means that the human being doesn’t recognize him-
self or herself as a part of nature, but as alien to nature. Does nature play 
some kind of role in oikology?
HRS. The relationship between oikology and ecology is fundamental in 
the sense that it also refers to the basis of oikological thinking, to the rela-
tionship between being-in 1 and being-in 2. Here too oikology attempts to 
unveil the original meaning of ecological thinking. 
From the oikological point of view, the ecological is a critique of the sub-
ject, not of reason and not of the human. At first this has nothing to do with 
the question whether ecology is anthropocentric or not, since the first thing 
to do is to clarify in which sense of human existence can it be said that it is 
centered and that it proceeds in a centering way. In order to understand this 
more precisely, oikology reconstructs the genealogy of ecological thought 
by looking at its development since the second half of the 19th century. The 
core of this development concerns the transfer of subjectivity to the center 
of life in the course of the 19th century: the theoretically determined subject 
was shifted from its absolute, autonomous status to a subject that found 
itself in the center of an already preconstituted world—the oikological start-
ing point for both phenomenology and philosophical anthropology. Insofar 
as subjectivity, theoretically determined as autonomous and absolute, can 
be distinguished from the concrete fact of the separated ab-solute subject 
[being-in 1], the abolition of the traditional position of transcendental sub-
jectivity does not mean a farewell to the subject as such, which has led to 
great misunderstandings in the 20th century; rather, it offers the possibility 
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of determining subjectivity anew and in close reference to its real factuality.
2. This was the starting point to discover subjectivity as being in the world. 
Expressing this, e.g., Husserl, like Scheler, used the notion of a “coordina-
tion in principle” of I / We and my / our environment; then it was described 
by Heidegger literally as being-in-the-world, as being in a practical-social 
world, but it was also emphasized by von Uexküll in the natural relation-
ship between the inner world of an animal and its environment. However, 
oikology does not only deal with the individual creature in its environment, 
including the observer [von Uexküll]. An oikological analysis of ecology as 
eco-logy also reflects the potential of reflection itself, qua theoria—sci-
ence—by showing how theory is the expression of the movement of life. 
Insofar as the reflective gaze is no longer bound to a particular theoretical 
system, it loses its anthropocentric character and becomes free to confront 
itself with the meontic structure of a “world” that in its cosmic dimensions 
is just as independent of me as is the real Other. Reflecting the reflective 
self-expression of life, however, is at the same time also an encounter with 
the endless depth of my own self as this reflective life itself. Thus I live in the 
center of my sojourn in a social world, doubly anchored in being-in 1 and 
being-in 2, but touching boundaries by being constantly confronted with 
myself, the Other, and the cosmic world.
The task of oikology in this context is to explain [a] how and to what ex-
tent being-in 1 necessarily generates a natural egocentrism; and [b] how this 
egocentrism is radicalized in the development of being-in 1 into being-in 2, 
so that, e.g., nature is understood only as being at my disposal, as a field 
subjected to my theoretical abilities and practical projects. Thus it can be 
said that the relation of being-in 1 to being-in 2 is the origin of an imbalance 
of human existence, given that a single existence normally makes the posi-
tion of its being-in 1 implicitly absolute as soon as it “awakens” in the be-
ing-in 2 of its social environment. This imbalance cannot be eliminated, so 
that the “ecological” task is to learn to control the tension between being-in 
1 and being-in 2, not with the aim of achieving a final equilibrium, for any 
equilibrium is threatened by instability, but as an attempt to realize a “stable 
imbalance,” as the biologist Josef H. Reicholf puts it.  
Therefore the main point of view of an oikological ecology is guided not 
by the question whether an ecological theory is anthropocentric or not, but 
by the fact that we must first unveil the origin of any centrism in the constitu-
tion of our bodily-corporeal existence and then learn to deal with the centric 
tendency of our existence—in theory as in practice. To achieve this, we do 
not need a specific ethic, but, more radically, a theory of the centric nature of 
our existence, and on this basis, a vision of ways in which we can change our 
life so that it can adapt itself to its facticity, and so that we dwell in it in such 
a way that we do as little damage as possible to the environments in which 
we are ensconced, to nature, and to Others.
MV. Speaking about this phenomenological ecology as relative to a phi-
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losophy of life, in the sense of the Imanishi Project [The world of living things] 
or von Uexküll [the Umwelt], do you think that this conception affects the 
phenomenological concept of the body, and if so, in what way?
HRS. I think there are two moments that connect von Uexküll and Imanishi 
with phenomenology and oikology: on the one hand, the emphasis on the 
correlativity of living beings and their environment; on the other hand, the 
inner perspective of the single experiencing being [Imanishi says that one 
has to “start from the existence of the individual”]. The latter is already a 
pre-interpretation of being-in 1 in the sense mentioned here. What Imani-
shi particularly emphasizes is the problem of equilibrium: following Nishida 
Kitaro, he summarizes the correlation of I [the living being] and my environ-
ment even more radically by saying that the living being is completely de-
termined by itself, but at the same time is determined through and through 
by its natural and social environment. Consequently, Imanishi speaks of an 
“equilibrium” that is constantly built up from two fields of force [“a mutual 
equilibrium of interacting forces”]. This leads us not only to make that strict 
distinction between being-in 1 and being-in 2, but also to emphasize that 
both ways of being-in are constitutive for our existence.
One sees that here we are no longer talking about a balance that is ob-
jectively perceived from the outside, but about the genesis of this balance, 
whereby the point of view lies in the perspective of the experiencing life 
itself—namely, in the tension of this self-moving life and its experiences of 
resistance. 
MV. How do you describe the relationship between the measure that di-
vides and creates property, on the one hand, and the experience of territory 
on the other? 
HRS. The relationship between measure and territory concerns the 
problem of imagination versus reality in the context of settlement: to claim, 
to delimit a land is both an imaginative act and an action that involves han-
dling the real—the real in the strict sense that I can touch it and it resists me. 
Thus to found a site, a city, means on the one hand to cut out a piece of the 
real land and to de-fine it as mine, to demarcate it, and on the other hand 
to give meaning to my action and its results by defining the de-fined land as 
my place—territory as a [common] possession. Although we know too little 
about the organization of social groups before becoming sedentary, it can be 
said that dwelling in human developments was a momentous turning point.
The house, at first perhaps a sacred site, a sanctuary [e.g., Stonehenge, 
Göbekli Tepe], connected the older magical structure of human experience 
with the newer mythical one, radicalizing the relationship between inside 
and outside. This was the starting point for life in the house, which in turn 
led to the distinction between a secret and an open space, and later be-
tween a private and a public space. This was done by forcing the develop-
ment from being-in 1 to being-in 2 in the sense that a differentiating process 
of socialization was increasingly superimposed on “silent” individual exis-
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tence; in a certain culture, in Europe, after a long time the possibility arose 
that on the ground of a specific sociality, existence discovered itself as an 
individual [individuality in the realm of being-in 2], primarily by not being 
able to penetrate into its in-dividual life. 
The egocentric perspective of my experiencing life has always been shaped 
by the style of a small group [family, clan, etc.] into which this life was born. 
However, at the level of settlement, it changes into an egocentricity that is 
determined as a common one by the de-defined / defined place we have 
occupied. De-definition and definition—as results of a struggle for property 
[for real land and the cultural interpretation associated with it]—to some 
extent stabilize the cohesion of a society that emerges from that struggle. 
This new society installs measures: norms, rules, laws in order to secure this 
cohesion in the future and to protect it against attacks from outside as well 
as against dissolutions within.
It is important to see that social cohesion is only relative and can be 
weakened at any time, both internally and externally. At the same time, it 
must be noted that the “identity” of such a society is more the invention 
of some of its leading members—who thus express their desire for secu-
rity in a common social home—than a real fact. It is real only as an imagi-
native product. In contrast to the identity of the merely factual in-dividual 
existence, any identification based on imagination is relative. It is precise-
ly this relativity that societies try to stabilize by measuring for “eternity.” 
Accordingly, actual “possession,” that is, what one really “has” by living it, is 
only one’s own bodily-corporeal existence and the open dimensions toward 
self and world, which, however, can never be fully appropriated. This is what 
I have with my life and for the time I live, including the ability to actualize the 
possibilities of expanding my experiences in relation both to myself and to 
the others I meet, along with my possibilities in relation to the endless space 
of the cosmic world. The rest is presumption.
MV. Do you consider it’s possible to see territorialization experience as 
the basis of the theory of appropriation by dis-appropriation? What is the 
place of this theory of identity within oikology?
HRS. Two types of appropriation and possession must be distinguished: 
1. the appropriation of a real space [site, territory] with all the goods provid-
ed by a force that legitimates itself by imaginative means; and 2. the self as 
a possession, which I already have on the one hand—my bodily-corporeal 
fact—and which I do not [yet] have on the other hand—as a possession on 
the basis of a reflective relation to myself. However, I have the opportunity to 
acquire the latter during my life, although, as mentioned, without the pros-
pect of attaining it completely and forever. This happens when I change the 
desire for possessing objects in favor of an appropriation of myself. These 
two different ways of appropriation—the technique of an external style, so 
to speak, and as Scheler said, the “technique of the soul”—can be under-
stood as reactions to the uncertainty of life and the will to secure my life.
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If the greatest enemy of the human being is his or her own egocentric 
desire, then the first way—the attempt to secure objects—is destined to 
fail if the tendency to gain objects strengthens egocentrism and thus the 
risk of conflict with others. In order to obtain some relatively stable secu-
rity, it is therefore necessary to take the second path of appropriation, i.e., 
to respond to the predominance of the first type of appropriation with a 
specific expropriation. This was apparently the fundamental [oikological] 
motivation for Plato’s concern for the soul, for the Christian effort toward 
a “true” territory different from all the territories of the world, and for the 
Buddhist reaction to “discrimination” on the part of the practical worldview, 
which loses itself in the field of distinct desired objects—and such an expro-
priation is also hidden in the practical reason of the epochē of Pyrrho and 
Husserl. 
As for the specifically oikological point of view, the expropriation consists 
in breaking the magical egocentric desire through the epochē, going back 
to the possibilities and limits of the original life-mode of being-in 1 and re-
vealing the constitutive process leading from being-in 1 to being-in 2.
MV. We understand with relative clarity the notion of one’s “own body” 
as my body, the one I recognize as mine [on the basis of an embodied con-
sciousness], wouldn’t this property be a first and originary measure, a first 
place or originary territory, even in light of the basic tensions that you sug-
gest about the paradox of measure and its beyond?
HRS. The first measurement is apparently based on physical proportions: 
“arm,” “hand,” “foot.” In the formation of such measures—which were al-
ready realized in early cultures [e.g., the hand imprints in prehistoric caves 
in Europe and Asia, or in Argentina in the Cueva de las manos]—one can 
discover an early transition from being-in 1 to being-in 2: on the one side 
there is the bodily-corporeal expression, i.e., the hand; on the other side, 
the immediate testimony of bodily identity fixed to the wall of the cave is 
solidified when by means of the intimate bodily manifestation a kind of early 
objectification is carried out with which sociality is constituted—namely, by 
arranging the hands of different people on the cave wall or by using the 
hand as an objective measure. In this way, the surrender of the bodily-own 
[the original possession] takes place in favor of the formation of a communi-
ty and the forms of its stabilization. The intimate bodily-corporeal manifes-
tation as the origin of measuring in social contexts can be described as an 
original measure [Ur-Maß], as a condition of the possibility of all measuring. 
Such an original measure is what it is only in the execution of a pure doing 
[according to being-in 1]; as soon as it becomes explicit, it functions within 
a social reality [being-in 2].
MV. In your paper about the trace of Teotihuacan,2 I noticed some sort of 
2  “Teotihuacan: fragilidad del nosotros. Un capítulo para una antropología filosófica 
interdisciplinar” en Jesús Díaz Álvarez y José Lasaga Medina, La razón y la vida. Escritos 
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analogy between the urban trace and the constitution of one’s own body. 
Can you describe in more detail how do you consider this mutual entailment 
between the body and the city, between spatialization and urbanization?
HRS. The fundamental thesis of oikology is that in all cases of founding a 
site or city, the bodily-corporeal factuality is the decisive factor—in the in-
teraction of imaginative and real moments. A fundamental mode of found-
ing a site is centering, i.e., defining the land around me as this concrete 
bodily-corporeal fact: I, the founder, draw a circle around me [Göbekli Tepe, 
Stonehenge—or Rome, in the use of a plough by Romulus]. In some cases, 
the imaginative moment may predominate, and a figure such as the human 
figure may more or less explicitly function as a pictorial master plan of the 
settlement.
What I said about Teotihuacan [and this is a speculative interpretation]—
namely, that the structure of the city recalls a human figure [head, heart, 
belly, arms, and spine]—does not mean that the founders of the city first 
had such a plan in mind and then realized it. It is rather a kind of implicit 
subjective expression of a living context, an “organism.” We know that the 
imaginative potential is founded in preconscious areas and becomes oper-
ational through “passive syntheses.”
Sergio Gómez Chávez found out that in the cave under the Temple of the 
Feathered Serpent in Teotihuacan, the path ends in a three-armed cham-
ber; at the intersection of these three rooms a vertical stele was erected, 
and the walls of the cave were made to sparkle like a starry sky by using a 
mineral powder. Gómez interprets this as a mythical place of world-creation 
that is to be preserved here. One could say that with this representation of 
the cosmos, the inhabitants of the city wanted to create a balance between 
their city and the universe. The orientation of the stele in the context of its 
surroundings, the cave, is the direct expression of a bodily-corporeal move-
ment: the stele is the magical, “intentional” extension of a bodily-corporeal 
existence. Then there is not only the horizontal plan of the city, but also a 
vertical orientation that is not only deeply rooted in the earth, but points up 
to the highest heavenly spheres—all in all, a perfectly complete model as an 
expression of the effort to give stability to social life.
MV. In which way or through which path does oikology capture the sense 
of culturality while going beyond the philosophy of culture?
HRS. Oikology is indeed a philosophy of culture, provided that “culture” 
encompasses the entire range of the relationship of the bodily-corporeal 
self to its environments [sociality and nature / cosmos]. However, oikology 
is not a philosophy of culture in the sense of the cultural sciences, insofar as 
these, as a complementary counterpart to the natural sciences, proceed by 
objectifying and presupposing the status of bodily-corporeal subjectivity, 
yet without being able to clarify the relation of subjectivity both to its me-
en homenaje a Javier San Martín, [Madrid: Trotta, 2018].
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ontic abysses of meaning and to meaningless real resistances. Oikology, on 
the other hand, sees in this relation the decisive moment that determines 
the capacity of the ego for all its actions, including science, since science 
itself is the result of a constitutive process of being-in 2 on the basis of be-
ing-in 1.
MV. Beyond the opposition nature/culture, what is outdoor space? I’m 
thinking about some sort of negative sedentarization, as in the Latcho Drom 
people, but also in the people displaced by war, alone and without direction 
in a violent sea. Is it possible to explain or describe this kind of experience 
of nomadism through oikology, or is this a limit of oikology theory? Does 
oikology offer a possible description of outdoor space?
HRS. All outdoor experiences—as out-doors—refer in principle to the 
house, even if it is transportable or lost, and are therefore topics of oikology. 
Refugees and displaced persons do not stand in opposition to the house; 
instead, by having lost their home through violence, they remain in a relation 
to the house. Moreover, the contrast to settlement is not simply nomadism, 
provided that the nomadic home can be described as a transportable 
house. But to avoid misunderstandings: to be related to the house does not 
mean that modes of nomadism are merely derived cases of living. Rather, 
it means that the nomadic implies a special relationship to places and is in 
a special correlation to bodily-corporeal existence in space and time, and 
their specific relation to sites means to be moved, shifted in real space. And 
of course there are more [possible and real] alternative ways of living, away 
from the striving for possession and the will to power, and possibilities in 
between settlement and nomadism. Australian Aborigines, for example, re-
alize a variable relation to certain places; they say, literally, “The land is the 
home,” and they do not de-fine a site to claim as territory, but establish a 
strictly regulated relationship to certain places to which they continuously 
return. And it must also not be forgotten that the human as such is already 
a home-related being, an in, insofar as bodily existence as the first in strives 
to secure its own life. This is the reason why oikology does not begin with 
dwelling, but with its condition, bodily-corporeal existence.
MV. Thank you very much, professor Hans Rainer, for your answers and 
your time. 
The author provides a detailed introduction to oikology in his book In. Grundrisse der 
Oikologie, which will be published in German in 2019 by Karl Alber [Freiburg/München]. 
For publications in Spanish, see “Planos para una filosofía oikológica,” en Revista de 
filosofía moderna y contemporánea, trans. Andrés Osswald, [Argentina: Ideas,2016], pp., 
10–33; see also “Teotihuacan: fragilidad del nosotros. Un capítulo para una antropología 
filosófica interdisciplinar,” in: José Lasaga Medina and Jesús M. Díaz Álvarez, eds., La 
razón y la vida, Escritos en homenaje a Javier San Martín, [Madrid: Trotta, 2018], pp.436–
459.
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